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The current definition of desertification excludes hyper-arid zones, given their lack of 
economic activity. However, the 101 million people living there, ongoing land degradation 
associated with the use of groundwater for intensive agriculture and climate-change-
induced aridity call for a revision of this definition. 
 
The United Nations (UN) Decade for Deserts and the Fight against Desertification comes to 
an end in 2020. Although deserts and desertification tend to go hand in hand in the public 
imagination, it is important to clarify their differences. Deserts are mature ecosystems with 
very low productivity due to severe water limitations promoted by low rainfall and high 
evapotranspiration levels, and have evolved under this state over a long period
1
. 
Desertification deprives land of its capacity to support life and to provide essential ecosystem 
services to human populations, leading to displacement of populations. The UN Convention 
to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) defines desertification as “land degradation in arid, 
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semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas resulting from various factors including climatic variation 
and human activity”
2
. This definition, widely used by scientists and policy makers alike, 
circumscribes the problem to those territories where the aridity index (AI) -the ratio between 
mean annual precipitation and mean annual potential evapotranspiration- is between 0.05 and 
0.65, roughly 31% of Earth's surface
3
. Land degradation in drylands is a key environmental 




The consolidation of the UNCCD definition of desertification required decades. This 
definition was an important conceptual breakthrough because it broadened the causes from 
being exclusively climatic to include the impacts of human activities. Despite its value and 
the important role it has played in fostering our understanding of desertification, this 
definition is not free from problems. A major inconsistency was to exclude hyper-arid lands 
(Figure 1a), which account for 17.2% of drylands worldwide
3
 or 6.4% of Earth's surface (i.e. 
over 9.5 million km
2
, almost the area of Europe). They were excluded because it was assumed 
that it is impossible to carry any economic activity in these harsh environments and, 
consequently, they are mostly uninhabited. Hence, degradation in hyper-arid areas would be 
driven by climatic variations, precluding their desertification according to the official 
definition of the UNCCD. This is in line with the common view that hyper-arid zones are 







Figure 1. (a) Global distribution of hyper-arid areas and aquifers with very low recharge rate 
(< 2 mm/year), according to World-wide Hydrogeological Mapping and Assessment 
Programme (https://www.whymap.org/whymap/EN/Maps_Data/Gwr/gwr_node_en.html). (b) 
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Status of groundwater bodies in the Middle East
19
 and some water balances by country
12
. The 
inset figures show a sequence of abandonment of crop circles after aquifer exhaustion in Al 
Kharj, Saudi Arabia (red dot in the map; images obtained from the Landsat satellite). 
 
Including hyper-arid areas within the scope of desertification  
At least two facts question the exclusion of hyper-arid zones from the UNCCD definition of 
desertification. First, ongoing increases in aridity linked to climate change are expanding 
drylands globally and changing the relative size of each aridity category (dry sub-humid, 
semiarid, arid and hyper-arid). According to the World Atlas of Desertification
3
 (WAD), a 
comparison of the 1951-1980 and 1981-2010 periods shows that drylands have increased by 
about 0.35% globally. The figure is probably higher, as this analysis excludes the five hottest 
years on record (2015 to 2019)
6
. Specifically, data from the WAD reveal that hyper-arid areas 
have increased by 0.09% as a result of the aridification of arid zones worldwide. Regional 
studies in China (where aridity has increased over 75.9% of its land area during the period 
1961-2016
7
) and Pakistan (0.52% increase in hyper-arid lands during the period 1901-2016
8
), 
and global estimates of changes in aridity
9
 point in the same direction. Furthermore, current 
forecasts indicate that hyper-arid areas will grow to occupy 8.4-12.6 % of Earth's total surface 
by the end of this century due to climate change-induced increases in aridity
10
. Following the 
current UNCCD definition of desertification, these new hyper-arid lands are, by current 
definition, free of desertification. Second, hyper-arid areas are home to more than 100 million 
people (1.7% of the world's population), most of whom live in 70,000 km
2
 of urban areas
4
. 
Many of these areas are in countries with population growth rates exceeding the world 
average. In addition, the livestock herds of nomadic populations have always grazed the 





. Consequently, the lack of economic activity in these areas must be 
reconsidered.  
Starting in the 1950s, major advances in geological knowledge, sinking of bores and 
wells, pump technology and rural electrification, together with cheap energy and very 
permissive –or nonexistent– regulations, laid the foundation for massive groundwater use in 
hyper-arid areas, which currently support more than 55,000 km
2
 of cultivated area 
worldwide
4
. Aquifer exploitation in these areas is regarded as groundwater mining because 
resource renewability is virtually nil. The exploitation of fossil groundwaters has made hyper-
arid areas such as the Saudi Desert bloom into verdant fields by tapping underground 
aquifers. In three decades, Saudi Arabia has consumed 600 billion m
3
 of water (Figure 2), 
became the 6
th
 largest global wheat exporter, and depleted its precious aquifers
11
. History 
repeats itself in most countries of the Middle East and other hyper-arid regions
12
. For 
example, in Jordan, Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates, 0.94, 3.40, and 3.99 km
3
 of water, 
respectively, are consumed annually. However, natural recharge only replenishes 0.01, 0.006, 
and 0.0003 % of these extractions, respectively. Not even Israel escapes this pattern (1.95 km
3
 
groundwater use; 0.006% of replenishment), demonstrating that being the world leader in 
using water efficiently does not prevent it from being trapped within the so-called Jevons 
paradox
13
: "as technological improvement increases the efficiency with which a resource is 
used, an increase in the consumption of that resource is more likely than a decrease". These 
examples illustrate how having access to cutting-edge technology does not ensure a 
sustainable use of resources but rather may contribute to their depletion. Groundwater 
depletion can be found in other hyper-arid areas under increasing population pressure, such as 
North Africa or China. For example, high water demand is threatening oases in the region of 
Timimoun (Algeria), which have been in use for more than 1000 years
14
. Similarly, oases in 
the Taklamakan Desert (northwestern China), which are fed by melting Himalayan ice, are 
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suffering from alarming agricultural expansion, while their recharge is declining due to global 
warming
15
.   
 
Figure 2. Wheat and cow fresh milk production (a), alfalfa meal and pellets imports (b) and 







Watering the desert  
Dairy farming in Saudi Arabia is one example of how technological advances can lead to 
markedly unsustainable water use in hyper-arid areas. Dairy has become a major industry in 
Saudi Arabia since 1998 and continues to grow, accounting for 3% of its GDP. The strategic 
and legitimate notion of self-sufficiency began as an ambitious, seemingly impossible dream. 
Saudi Arabia sought to manufacture all of its products from milk produced by its own 
livestock, the needs of which would be covered by local crops. Notwithstanding the realities 
of a desert environment, the 365,000 heads of cattle being raised in Saudi Arabia produce 
2,159,000 t of fresh milk annually
16
. The amount of water to support this production system is 
astonishing and requires wells 150-1,500 m deep
17
. In addition to crop irrigation, large 
quantities of water are needed for the dairy herd itself, as each milk-producing cow requires 
75-110 l of water per day. Water is also used for cooling the herd, and cattle pens are 
equipped with evaporative cooling systems. Water withdrawal has gradually increased to ~20 
km
3
 per year in Saudi Arabia (Figure 2c) and almost 30 km
3
 if we consider the Arabian 
Peninsula as a whole.  
The exhaustion of the immense Arabian aquifer
18
 is manifested by various symptoms 
that indicate the onset of desertification. Immediate effects are water storage decline and land 
abandonment
19
. Satellite images show the migration of crop circles to areas where 
groundwater is still available, leaving a trail of ochre cultivation circles that blur the desert 
sand (Figure 1b). The decline in wheat production (Figure 2a), the ban on forage crop 
cultivation since 2016, the growing imports of alfalfa (Figure 2b), and the Saudi Arabian 
Initiative, a plan to seek “food security” by developing farm resources in land-rich, cash-poor 
countries around the world, confirm the collapse of an economic system that was established 




A call to rethink how we monitor and define desertification 
Overexploitation of water resources in hyper-arid lands fits perfectly into e concept of 
desertification: irreversible degradation of a vital resource driven by human activities. Along 
with a formal inclusion of hyper-arid areas in the UNCCD definition of desertification, it is 
necessary to refine the indicators used for monitoring desertification processes. For example, 
positive trends in net primary production in hyper-arid lands should warn about the 
emergence of irrigated areas. The assessment of these anomalies should be accompanied by 
the monitoring of groundwater use with tools such as the Gravity Recovery and Climate 
Experiment satellite mission
19
 combined with local knowledge and information (e.g. aquifer 
piezometric measurements, crop production and market statistics) to validate and interpret 
remote sensing data
20
. It is critical that we have evidence of aquifer exploitation in order to 
take early action to reduce the onset of desertification in hyper-arid areas. 
Over the last few decades, desertification has not attracted as much public and 
scientific attention as other major environmental issues such as climate change and 
biodiversity loss. But as already emphasized by the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
back in 2005 “desertification is one of the world’s most alarming processes of environmental 
degradation”, and its negative impacts will be amplified by the ongoing process of 
aridification of our planet as a result of climate change
10
. It is thus time to rethink how we 
define desertification to better study and understand it. This is a critical step to improve the 
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